Brokering an access to information (ATI) request is not easy. While citizens advocate for an open door policy to the backrooms of government factions, the feds attempt to restrict the flowing encampment of sightseers. When it comes to cutting and deleting information from ATI requests, three major sections of the Access to Information Act (ATIA) are leveraged in the government’s favour. The first section is 19(1), which pertains to redacting personal information around individuals either living or who have been deceased for less than twenty years. Without a doubt, there is a need to protect the personal information of individuals within Canadian society—federally employed or not. Interestingly, Hewitt (2012) reveals that this section has been maintained by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as means to ensure “future recruitment of informers based on their identities being kept secret” (p. 197). In other words, CSIS does not want its informants to worry that one day their names will be disclosed. Personally, this section appears justifiable in its intended use. However, it is worrisome to imagine how broadly personal information may be interpreted within the powers of government agencies as access to information analyst subjectively cut and delete information. The second section, 15(1), permits the government to remove any material that may be “injurious” to Canada’s national security and to “the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities.” If anyone has ever seen documents from a completed ATI requests, this section is sure to be visible on almost every page. There is no doubt a need to protect the interests of Canadian society against potential and real threats that could arise from authorized disclosure. However, this section is extraordinarily broad and has led to more conservative releases of public information as noted by Hewitt in an exchange of emails between himself and an Office of Information Commissioner in August of 2007 (see page 202). The final section of the ATIA that has been a major source of ‘cuts’ and ‘deletions’ is under section 13(1) that pertains to information supplied by another government in confidence. This section appears to be troublesome to some regard as I was unable to understand how documents are passed “in confidence.” In other words, the procedures of such exchanges are unknown and therefore open the door of possibility for increased private exchanges of information. Hewitt (2012) explains that it is a widely held rule that other governments and agencies restrict the revealing of internal secrets. For example, when the US government “prevent[ed] the release of material within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) file on John Lennon that had been supplied to it by the British intelligence” (p. 198). It is also argued that in certain cases, material is exempt from ATI requests not as a result of potential threat to Canadian society but rather as an attempt to reduce “embarrassment for the current federal government in the context of the never-ending Canadian struggle over national unity” (p. 200). As a result, it is argued that the default position of governments is: “when in doubt, cut it out” (p. 204). And to some, this may be the assumed practice. When restricting information from the public in an ATI request two outcomes are presented: the requestor will either carry along accepting the redaction or he/she will enter into a complaints process against the access to information analyst. Alternatively, when too much information is revealed, two other possible realities exist: either the information analyst will be penalized, subject to review, or fired for their actions or the agency runs the risk of losing public confidence in the integrity of government.
Food for thought from class: are the limitations on ATI ‘cuts’ and ‘deletions’ justifiable?
Works Cited
Hewitt, Steve (2012). “‘He Who Controls the Present, Controls the Past’: The Canadian Security State’s Imperfect Censorship under the Access to Information Act”, in M. Larsen and K. Walby (eds) Brokering Access: Power, Politics, and Freedom of Information Process in Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press, pp. 194-208.
